secure_boot/SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT: Only the first position of signature blocks is used to verify any update

components/bootloader_support/src/secure_boot.c

@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ static void rsa_check_signature_on_update_check(void)
         ESP_LOGE(TAG, "This app is not signed, but check signature on update is enabled in config. It won't be possible to verify any update.");
         abort();
     }
+#if CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT && SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS > 1
+    if (digests.num_digests > 1) {
+        ESP_LOGW(TAG, "App has %d signatures. Only the first position of signature blocks is used to verify any update", digests.num_digests);
+    }
+#endif
 }
 #endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
 

components/bootloader_support/src/secure_boot_v2/secure_boot_signatures_app.c

@@ -198,7 +198,13 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signa
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    for (unsigned app_blk_idx = 0; app_blk_idx < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; app_blk_idx++) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
+    const unsigned secure_boot_num_blocks = 1;
+#else
+    const unsigned secure_boot_num_blocks = SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS;
+#endif
+
+    for (unsigned app_blk_idx = 0; app_blk_idx < secure_boot_num_blocks; app_blk_idx++) {
         uint8_t app_blk_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 };
         const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *app_blk = &sig_block->block[app_blk_idx];
         const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *trusted_block = NULL;
@@ -213,7 +219,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signa
         bootloader_sha256_finish(sig_block_sha, app_blk_digest);
 
         /* Check if the key is one we trust */
-        for (unsigned trusted_key_idx = 0; trusted_key_idx < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; trusted_key_idx++) {
+        for (unsigned trusted_key_idx = 0; trusted_key_idx < secure_boot_num_blocks; trusted_key_idx++) {
             if (memcmp(app_blk_digest, trusted.key_digests[trusted_key_idx], ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN) == 0) {
                 ESP_LOGI(TAG, "#%d app key digest == #%d trusted key digest", app_blk_idx, trusted_key_idx);
                 trusted_block = app_blk;

docs/en/security/secure-boot-v2.rst

@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ This may be desirable in cases where the delay of Secure Boot verification on st
 
 In this mode, any public key which is present in the signature block of the currently running app will be used to verify the signature of a newly updated app. (The signature on the running app isn't verified during the update process, it's assumed to be valid.) In this way the system creates a chain of trust from the running app to the newly updated app.
 
-For this reason, it's essential that the initial app flashed to the device is also signed. A check is run on app startup and the app will abort if no signatures are found. This is to try and prevent a situation where no update is possible. Note again that, unlike hardware Secure Boot V2, the signature of the running app isn't verified on boot. The system only checks that at least one public key can be found there, in order to not prevent an update.
+For this reason, it's essential that the initial app flashed to the device is also signed. A check is run on app startup and the app will abort if no signatures are found. This is to try and prevent a situation where no update is possible. The app should have only one valid signature block in the first position. Note again that, unlike hardware Secure Boot V2, the signature of the running app isn't verified on boot.The system only verifies a signature block in the first position and ignores the other (2) appended signatures.
 
 .. note::