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@@ -1,408 +0,0 @@
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-/* aes_encrypt.c - TinyCrypt implementation of AES encryption procedure */
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-
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-/*
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- * Copyright (C) 2017 by Intel Corporation, All Rights Reserved.
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- *
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- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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- *
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- * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
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- * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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- *
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- * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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- *
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- * - Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its contributors
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- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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- * without specific prior written permission.
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- *
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- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
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- * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
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- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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- * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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- * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
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- * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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- * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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- */
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-
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-#include "mesh_util.h"
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-#include "mesh_aes_encrypt.h"
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-
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-/* max number of calls until change the key (2^48).*/
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-const static uint64_t MAX_CALLS = ((uint64_t)1 << 48);
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-
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-/*
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- * gf_wrap -- In our implementation, GF(2^128) is represented as a 16 byte
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- * array with byte 0 the most significant and byte 15 the least significant.
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- * High bit carry reduction is based on the primitive polynomial
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- *
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- * X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + X + 1,
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- *
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- * which leads to the reduction formula X^128 = X^7 + X^2 + X + 1. Indeed,
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- * since 0 = (X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + 1) mod (X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + X + 1) and since
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- * addition of polynomials with coefficients in Z/Z(2) is just XOR, we can
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- * add X^128 to both sides to get
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- *
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- * X^128 = (X^7 + X^2 + X + 1) mod (X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + X + 1)
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- *
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- * and the coefficients of the polynomial on the right hand side form the
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- * string 1000 0111 = 0x87, which is the value of gf_wrap.
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- *
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- * This gets used in the following way. Doubling in GF(2^128) is just a left
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- * shift by 1 bit, except when the most significant bit is 1. In the latter
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- * case, the relation X^128 = X^7 + X^2 + X + 1 says that the high order bit
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- * that overflows beyond 128 bits can be replaced by addition of
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- * X^7 + X^2 + X + 1 <--> 0x87 to the low order 128 bits. Since addition
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- * in GF(2^128) is represented by XOR, we therefore only have to XOR 0x87
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- * into the low order byte after a left shift when the starting high order
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- * bit is 1.
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- */
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-const unsigned char gf_wrap = 0x87;
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-
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-static const uint8_t sbox[256] = {
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- 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b,
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- 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0,
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- 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26,
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- 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15,
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- 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2,
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- 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0,
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- 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed,
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- 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf,
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- 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f,
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- 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5,
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- 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec,
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- 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73,
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- 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
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- 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c,
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- 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d,
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- 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08,
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- 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f,
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- 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a, 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e,
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- 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11,
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- 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf,
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- 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f,
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- 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
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-};
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-
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-static inline unsigned int rotword(unsigned int a)
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-{
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- return (((a) >> 24) | ((a) << 8));
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-}
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-
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-#define subbyte(a, o) (sbox[((a) >> (o))&0xff] << (o))
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-#define subword(a) (subbyte(a, 24)|subbyte(a, 16)|subbyte(a, 8)|subbyte(a, 0))
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-
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-int tc_aes128_set_encrypt_key(TCAesKeySched_t s, const uint8_t *k)
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-{
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- const unsigned int rconst[11] = {
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- 0x00000000, 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000, 0x10000000,
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- 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000, 0x1b000000, 0x36000000
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- };
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- unsigned int i;
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- unsigned int t;
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-
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- if (s == (TCAesKeySched_t) 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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- } else if (k == (const uint8_t *) 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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- }
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-
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- for (i = 0; i < Nk; ++i) {
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- s->words[i] = (k[Nb * i] << 24) | (k[Nb * i + 1] << 16) |
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- (k[Nb * i + 2] << 8) | (k[Nb * i + 3]);
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- }
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-
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- for (; i < (Nb * (Nr + 1)); ++i) {
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- t = s->words[i - 1];
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- if ((i % Nk) == 0) {
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- t = subword(rotword(t)) ^ rconst[i / Nk];
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- }
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- s->words[i] = s->words[i - Nk] ^ t;
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- }
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-
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- return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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-}
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-
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-static inline void add_round_key(uint8_t *s, const unsigned int *k)
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-{
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- s[0] ^= (uint8_t)(k[0] >> 24); s[1] ^= (uint8_t)(k[0] >> 16);
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- s[2] ^= (uint8_t)(k[0] >> 8); s[3] ^= (uint8_t)(k[0]);
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- s[4] ^= (uint8_t)(k[1] >> 24); s[5] ^= (uint8_t)(k[1] >> 16);
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- s[6] ^= (uint8_t)(k[1] >> 8); s[7] ^= (uint8_t)(k[1]);
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- s[8] ^= (uint8_t)(k[2] >> 24); s[9] ^= (uint8_t)(k[2] >> 16);
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- s[10] ^= (uint8_t)(k[2] >> 8); s[11] ^= (uint8_t)(k[2]);
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- s[12] ^= (uint8_t)(k[3] >> 24); s[13] ^= (uint8_t)(k[3] >> 16);
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- s[14] ^= (uint8_t)(k[3] >> 8); s[15] ^= (uint8_t)(k[3]);
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-}
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-
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-static inline void sub_bytes(uint8_t *s)
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-{
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- unsigned int i;
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-
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- for (i = 0; i < (Nb * Nk); ++i) {
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- s[i] = sbox[s[i]];
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- }
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-}
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-
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-#define triple(a)(_double_byte(a)^(a))
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-
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-static inline void mult_row_column(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in)
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-{
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- out[0] = _double_byte(in[0]) ^ triple(in[1]) ^ in[2] ^ in[3];
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- out[1] = in[0] ^ _double_byte(in[1]) ^ triple(in[2]) ^ in[3];
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- out[2] = in[0] ^ in[1] ^ _double_byte(in[2]) ^ triple(in[3]);
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- out[3] = triple(in[0]) ^ in[1] ^ in[2] ^ _double_byte(in[3]);
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-}
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-
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-static inline void mix_columns(uint8_t *s)
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-{
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- uint8_t t[Nb * Nk] = {0};
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-
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- mult_row_column(t, s);
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- mult_row_column(&t[Nb], s + Nb);
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- mult_row_column(&t[2 * Nb], s + (2 * Nb));
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- mult_row_column(&t[3 * Nb], s + (3 * Nb));
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- (void) _copy(s, sizeof(t), t, sizeof(t));
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-}
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-
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-/*
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- * This shift_rows also implements the matrix flip required for mix_columns, but
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- * performs it here to reduce the number of memory operations.
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- */
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-static inline void shift_rows(uint8_t *s)
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-{
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- uint8_t t[Nb * Nk] = {0};
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-
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- t[0] = s[0]; t[1] = s[5]; t[2] = s[10]; t[3] = s[15];
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- t[4] = s[4]; t[5] = s[9]; t[6] = s[14]; t[7] = s[3];
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- t[8] = s[8]; t[9] = s[13]; t[10] = s[2]; t[11] = s[7];
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- t[12] = s[12]; t[13] = s[1]; t[14] = s[6]; t[15] = s[11];
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- (void) _copy(s, sizeof(t), t, sizeof(t));
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-}
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-
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-int tc_aes_encrypt(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, const TCAesKeySched_t s)
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-{
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- uint8_t state[Nk * Nb] = {0};
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- unsigned int i;
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-
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- if (out == (uint8_t *) 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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- } else if (in == (const uint8_t *) 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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- } else if (s == (TCAesKeySched_t) 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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- }
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-
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- (void)_copy(state, sizeof(state), in, sizeof(state));
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- add_round_key(state, s->words);
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-
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- for (i = 0; i < (Nr - 1); ++i) {
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- sub_bytes(state);
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- shift_rows(state);
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- mix_columns(state);
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- add_round_key(state, s->words + Nb * (i + 1));
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- }
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-
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- sub_bytes(state);
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- shift_rows(state);
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- add_round_key(state, s->words + Nb * (i + 1));
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-
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- (void)_copy(out, sizeof(state), state, sizeof(state));
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-
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- /* zeroing out the state buffer */
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- _set(state, TC_ZERO_BYTE, sizeof(state));
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-
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- return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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-}
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-
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-int tc_cmac_setup(TCCmacState_t s, const uint8_t *key, TCAesKeySched_t sched)
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-{
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-
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- /* input sanity check: */
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- if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0 ||
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- key == (const uint8_t *) 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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- }
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-
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- /* put s into a known state */
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- _set(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
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- s->sched = sched;
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-
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- /* configure the encryption key used by the underlying block cipher */
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- tc_aes128_set_encrypt_key(s->sched, key);
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-
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- /* compute s->K1 and s->K2 from s->iv using s->keyid */
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- _set(s->iv, 0, TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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- tc_aes_encrypt(s->iv, s->iv, s->sched);
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- gf_double (s->K1, s->iv);
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- gf_double (s->K2, s->K1);
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-
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- /* reset s->iv to 0 in case someone wants to compute now */
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- tc_cmac_init(s);
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-
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- return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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-}
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-
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-/*
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- * assumes: out != NULL and points to a GF(2^n) value to receive the
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- * doubled value;
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- * in != NULL and points to a 16 byte GF(2^n) value
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- * to double;
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- * the in and out buffers do not overlap.
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- * effects: doubles the GF(2^n) value pointed to by "in" and places
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- * the result in the GF(2^n) value pointed to by "out."
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- */
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-void gf_double(uint8_t *out, uint8_t *in)
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-{
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-
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- /* start with low order byte */
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- uint8_t *x = in + (TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
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-
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- /* if msb == 1, we need to add the gf_wrap value, otherwise add 0 */
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- uint8_t carry = (in[0] >> 7) ? gf_wrap : 0;
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-
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- out += (TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
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- for (;;) {
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- *out-- = (*x << 1) ^ carry;
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- if (x == in) {
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- break;
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- }
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- carry = *x-- >> 7;
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- }
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-}
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-
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-int tc_cmac_init(TCCmacState_t s)
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-{
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- /* input sanity check: */
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- if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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- }
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-
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- /* CMAC starts with an all zero initialization vector */
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- _set(s->iv, 0, TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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-
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- /* and the leftover buffer is empty */
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- _set(s->leftover, 0, TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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- s->leftover_offset = 0;
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-
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- /* Set countdown to max number of calls allowed before re-keying: */
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- s->countdown = MAX_CALLS;
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-
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- return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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-}
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-
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-int tc_cmac_update(TCCmacState_t s, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length)
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-{
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- unsigned int i;
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-
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- /* input sanity check: */
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- if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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- }
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- if (data_length == 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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- }
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- if (data == (const uint8_t *) 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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- }
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-
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- if (s->countdown == 0) {
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- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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- }
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-
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- s->countdown--;
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-
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- if (s->leftover_offset > 0) {
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- /* last data added to s didn't end on a TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE byte boundary */
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- size_t remaining_space = TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - s->leftover_offset;
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-
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- if (data_length < remaining_space) {
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|
- /* still not enough data to encrypt this time either */
|
|
|
- _copy(&s->leftover[s->leftover_offset], data_length, data, data_length);
|
|
|
- s->leftover_offset += data_length;
|
|
|
- return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- /* leftover block is now full; encrypt it first */
|
|
|
- _copy(&s->leftover[s->leftover_offset],
|
|
|
- remaining_space,
|
|
|
- data,
|
|
|
- remaining_space);
|
|
|
- data_length -= remaining_space;
|
|
|
- data += remaining_space;
|
|
|
- s->leftover_offset = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) {
|
|
|
- s->iv[i] ^= s->leftover[i];
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- tc_aes_encrypt(s->iv, s->iv, s->sched);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* CBC encrypt each (except the last) of the data blocks */
|
|
|
- while (data_length > TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) {
|
|
|
- s->iv[i] ^= data[i];
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- tc_aes_encrypt(s->iv, s->iv, s->sched);
|
|
|
- data += TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
- data_length -= TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (data_length > 0) {
|
|
|
- /* save leftover data for next time */
|
|
|
- _copy(s->leftover, data_length, data, data_length);
|
|
|
- s->leftover_offset = data_length;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-int tc_cmac_final(uint8_t *tag, TCCmacState_t s)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- uint8_t *k = NULL;
|
|
|
- unsigned int i;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* input sanity check: */
|
|
|
- if (tag == (uint8_t *) 0 ||
|
|
|
- s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
|
|
|
- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (s->leftover_offset == TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
|
- /* the last message block is a full-sized block */
|
|
|
- k = (uint8_t *) s->K1;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- /* the final message block is not a full-sized block */
|
|
|
- size_t remaining = TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - s->leftover_offset;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- _set(&s->leftover[s->leftover_offset], 0, remaining);
|
|
|
- s->leftover[s->leftover_offset] = TC_CMAC_PADDING;
|
|
|
- k = (uint8_t *) s->K2;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) {
|
|
|
- s->iv[i] ^= s->leftover[i] ^ k[i];
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tc_aes_encrypt(tag, s->iv, s->sched);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* erasing state: */
|
|
|
- tc_cmac_erase(s);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-int tc_cmac_erase(TCCmacState_t s)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
|
|
|
- return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* destroy the current state */
|
|
|
- _set(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
-}
|
lly