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@@ -0,0 +1,2439 @@
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+/*
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+ * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
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+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2011, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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+ *
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+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
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+ * See README for more details.
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+ */
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+
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+#include "utils/includes.h"
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+#include "utils/common.h"
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+#include "utils/state_machine.h"
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+#include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
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+#include "ap/wpa_auth.h"
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+#include "ap/wpa_auth_i.h"
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+#include "ap/wpa_auth_ie.h"
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+#include "utils/wpa_debug.h"
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+#include "hostapd.h"
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+#include "rsn_supp/wpa.h"
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+#include "ap/ap_config.h"
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+#include "common/wpa_common.h"
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+
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+#include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
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+#include "crypto/crypto.h"
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+#include "crypto/sha1.h"
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+#include "crypto/sha256.h"
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+#include "crypto/random.h"
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+
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+#include "esp_supplicant/esp_wifi_driver.h"
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+#include "esp_wifi.h"
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+#include "esp_private/wifi.h"
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+
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+#define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
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+#define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
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+#define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
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+
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+
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+static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
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+static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
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+static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len);
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+static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ struct wpa_group *group);
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+static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
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+static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ struct wpa_group *group);
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+static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ struct wpa_group *group);
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+
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+static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount = 4;
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+static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount = 4;
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+static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
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+static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
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+static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
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+
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+#define WPA_SM_MAX_INDEX 16
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+static void *s_sm_table[WPA_SM_MAX_INDEX];
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+static u32 s_sm_valid_bitmap = 0;
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+
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+static struct wpa_state_machine * wpa_auth_get_sm(u32 index)
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+{
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+ if ( (index < WPA_SM_MAX_INDEX) && (BIT(index) & s_sm_valid_bitmap)){
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+ return s_sm_table[index];
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+ }
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+
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+ return NULL;
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+}
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+
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+static void wpa_auth_add_sm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
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+{
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+ if (sm) {
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+ u8 i;
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+ for (i=0; i<WPA_SM_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
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+ if (BIT(i) & s_sm_valid_bitmap) {
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+ if (s_sm_table[i] == sm) {
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+ wpa_printf( MSG_INFO, "add sm already exist i=%d", i);
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+ }
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ s_sm_table[i] = sm;
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+ s_sm_valid_bitmap |= BIT(i);
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+ sm->index = i;
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+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "add sm, index=%d bitmap=%x\n", i, s_sm_valid_bitmap);
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+ return;
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+ }
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+ }
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+}
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+
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+static void wpa_auth_del_sm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
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+{
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+ if (sm && (sm->index < WPA_SM_MAX_INDEX)) {
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+ if (sm != s_sm_table[sm->index]) {
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+ wpa_printf( MSG_INFO, "del sm error %d", sm->index);
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+ }
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+ s_sm_table[sm->index] = NULL;
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+ s_sm_valid_bitmap &= ~BIT(sm->index);
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+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "del sm, index=%d bitmap=%x\n", sm->index, s_sm_valid_bitmap);
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+ }
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+}
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+
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+static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
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+ struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
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+{
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+
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+static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var,
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+ int value)
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+{
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+}
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+
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+
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+static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var)
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+{
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+ return -1;
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+}
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+
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+static inline const u8 * wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ const u8 *addr, const u8 *prev_psk)
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+{
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+ struct hostapd_data *hapd = (struct hostapd_data *)esp_wifi_get_hostap_private_internal();
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+
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+ if (!hapd){
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ return (u8*)hostapd_get_psk(hapd->conf, addr, prev_psk);
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+}
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+
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+static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ const u8 *addr, u8 *msk, size_t *len)
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+{
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+ return -1;
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+}
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+
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+static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ int vlan_id,
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+ enum wpa_alg alg, const u8 *addr, int idx,
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+ u8 *key, size_t key_len)
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+{
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+ return esp_wifi_set_ap_key_internal(alg, addr, idx, key, key_len);
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+}
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+
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+
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+static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ const u8 *addr, int idx, u8 *seq)
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+{
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+ return -1;
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+}
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+
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+/* fix buf for tx for now */
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+#define WPA_TX_MSG_BUFF_MAXLEN 200
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+
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+static inline int
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+wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
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+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int encrypt)
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+{
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+ void *buffer = os_malloc(256);
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+ struct l2_ethhdr *eth = buffer;
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+
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+ if (!buffer){
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+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "send_eapol, buffer=%p\n", buffer);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ memcpy(eth->h_dest, addr, ETH_ALEN);
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+ memcpy(eth->h_source, wpa_auth->addr, ETH_ALEN);
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+ eth->h_proto = host_to_be16(ETH_P_EAPOL);
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+
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+ memcpy((char *)buffer + sizeof(struct l2_ethhdr), data, data_len);
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+ esp_wifi_internal_tx(1, buffer, sizeof(struct l2_ethhdr) + data_len);
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+ os_free(buffer);
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ int (*cb)(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx),
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+ void *cb_ctx)
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+{
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ const u8 *addr)
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+{
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR, MAC2STR(addr));
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+ esp_wifi_ap_deauth_internal((uint8_t*)addr, WLAN_REASON_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT);
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+ return;
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+}
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+
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+static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
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+{
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+ int ret = 0;
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+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
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+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
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+ ret = 1;
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+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
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+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
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+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
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+ ret = 1;
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+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
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+ return ret;
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+}
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+
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+static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
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+{
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+ struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
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+ struct wpa_group *group;
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+
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+ for (group = wpa_auth->group; group; group = group->next) {
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+ group->GTKReKey = TRUE;
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+ do {
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+ group->changed = FALSE;
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+ wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
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+ } while (group->changed);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
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+ eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey,
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+ 0, wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
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+ }
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+}
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+
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+
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+static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
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+{
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+ struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
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+
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+ wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
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+ wpa_sm_step(sm);
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+}
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+
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+static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ struct wpa_group *group)
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+{
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+ u8 buf[ETH_ALEN + 8 + sizeof(group)];
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+ u8 rkey[32];
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+
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+ if (os_get_random(group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN) < 0)
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+ return -1;
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+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
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+ * Local MAC Address || Time)
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+ */
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+ memcpy(buf, wpa_auth->addr, ETH_ALEN);
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+ wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf + ETH_ALEN);
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+ memcpy(buf + ETH_ALEN + 8, &group, sizeof(group));
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+ if (os_get_random(rkey, sizeof(rkey)) < 0)
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+ return -1;
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+
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+ if (sha1_prf(rkey, sizeof(rkey), "Init Counter", buf, sizeof(buf),
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+ group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0)
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+ return -1;
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+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Key Counter",
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+ group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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+
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+static struct wpa_group * wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ int vlan_id, int delay_init)
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+{
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+ struct wpa_group *group;
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+ group = (struct wpa_group *)os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group));
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+ if (group == NULL)
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+ return NULL;
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+
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+ group->GTKAuthenticator = TRUE;
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+ group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
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+
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+ if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
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+ wpa_printf( MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
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+ "for secure operations - update keys later when "
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+ "the first station connects");
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+ }
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
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+ * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
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+ * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
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+ * on embedded devices.
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+ */
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+ if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
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+ wpa_printf( MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
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+ "initialization.");
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+ os_free(group);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ group->GInit = TRUE;
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+ if (delay_init) {
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+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
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+ "until Beacon frames have been configured\n");
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+ /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
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+ } else {
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+ wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
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+ group->GInit = FALSE;
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+ wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
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+ }
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+
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+ return group;
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+}
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+
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+
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+/**
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+ * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
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+ * @addr: Authenticator address
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+ * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
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+ * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
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+ * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
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+ */
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+struct wpa_authenticator * wpa_init(const u8 *addr,
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+ struct wpa_auth_config *conf,
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+ struct wpa_auth_callbacks *cb)
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+{
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+ struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth;
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+ wpa_auth = (struct wpa_authenticator *)os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator));
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+ if (wpa_auth == NULL)
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+ return NULL;
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+ memcpy(wpa_auth->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
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+ memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
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+
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+ if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
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+ wpa_printf( MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
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+ os_free(wpa_auth);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ wpa_auth->group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, 0, 0);
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+ if (wpa_auth->group == NULL) {
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+ os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
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+ os_free(wpa_auth);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
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+ wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
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+ if (wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache == NULL) {
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+ wpa_printf( MSG_ERROR, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
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+ os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
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+ pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
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+ os_free(wpa_auth);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
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+
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+ return wpa_auth;
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+}
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+
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+struct wpa_state_machine *
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+wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
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+{
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+ struct wpa_state_machine *sm;
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+
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+ sm = (struct wpa_state_machine *)os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine));
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+ if (sm == NULL)
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+ return NULL;
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+ memcpy(sm->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
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+
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+ sm->wpa_auth = wpa_auth;
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+ sm->group = wpa_auth->group;
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+ wpa_auth_add_sm(sm);
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+
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+ return sm;
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+}
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+
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+int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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+ struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
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+{
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+ if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL)
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+ return -1;
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+
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+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
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+ if (sm->ft_completed) {
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+ wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
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+ "FT authentication already completed - do not "
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+ "start 4-way handshake");
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
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+
|
|
|
+ if (sm->started) {
|
|
|
+ memset(&sm->key_replay, 0, sizeof(sm->key_replay));
|
|
|
+ sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ return wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->started = 1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->Init = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
|
|
|
+ return 1; /* should not really happen */
|
|
|
+ sm->Init = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ return wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
|
|
|
+ * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
|
|
|
+ * STA has not yet been removed. */
|
|
|
+ if (sm == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->wpa_key_mgmt = 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_del_sm(sm);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
|
|
|
+ sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
|
+ sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ os_free(sm->assoc_resp_ftie);
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_free_sta_sm: free eapol=%p\n", sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
|
|
|
+ os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
|
|
|
+ os_free(sm->wpa_ie);
|
|
|
+ os_free(sm);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "deinit sm=%p\n", sm);
|
|
|
+ if (sm == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ets_timer_disarm(&sm->resend_eapol);
|
|
|
+ ets_timer_done(&sm->resend_eapol);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm->in_step_loop) {
|
|
|
+ /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
|
|
|
+ * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
|
|
|
+ "machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
|
|
|
+ sm->pending_deinit = 1;
|
|
|
+ } else
|
|
|
+ wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ if (sm == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->PTKRequest = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ sm->PTK_valid = 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
|
|
|
+ const u8 *replay_counter)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ int i;
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
|
|
|
+ if (!ctr[i].valid)
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ if (memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
|
|
|
+ WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0)
|
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
|
|
|
+ const u8 *replay_counter)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ int i;
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
|
|
|
+ if (ctr[i].valid &&
|
|
|
+ (replay_counter == NULL ||
|
|
|
+ memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
|
|
|
+ WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0))
|
|
|
+ ctr[i].valid = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+static int ICACHE_FLASH_ATTR ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_ie_data ie;
|
|
|
+ struct rsn_mdie *mdie;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde->rsn_ie, kde->rsn_ie_len, &ie) < 0 ||
|
|
|
+ ie.num_pmkid != 1 || ie.pmkid == NULL) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
|
|
|
+ "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, ie.pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
|
|
|
+ sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!kde->mdie || !kde->ftie) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
|
|
|
+ "message 2/4", kde->mdie ? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ mdie = (struct rsn_mdie *) (kde->mdie + 2);
|
|
|
+ if (kde->mdie[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) ||
|
|
|
+ memcmp(wpa_auth->conf.mobility_domain, mdie->mobility_domain,
|
|
|
+ MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
|
|
|
+ (kde->ftie[1] != sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1] ||
|
|
|
+ memcmp(kde->ftie, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
|
|
|
+ 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) != 0)) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
|
|
|
+ kde->ftie, kde->ftie_len);
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
|
|
|
+ sm->assoc_resp_ftie, 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int group)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ if (group && wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
|
+ } else if (!group && sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth, sm->addr) > 0)
|
|
|
+ return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
|
|
|
+ * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
|
+ u16 key_info, key_data_length;
|
|
|
+ enum { PAIRWISE_2, PAIRWISE_4, GROUP_2, REQUEST,
|
|
|
+ SMK_M1, SMK_M3, SMK_ERROR } msg;
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
|
|
|
+ int ft;
|
|
|
+ const u8 *eapol_key_ie;
|
|
|
+ size_t eapol_key_ie_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key))
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
|
|
|
+ key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
|
+ key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
|
|
|
+ key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_data_length);
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
|
|
|
+ " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u\n",
|
|
|
+ MAC2STR(sm->addr), key_info, key->type, key_data_length);
|
|
|
+ if (key_data_length > data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - sizeof(*key)) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_INFO, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
|
|
|
+ "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)\n",
|
|
|
+ key_data_length,
|
|
|
+ (unsigned long) (data_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
|
|
|
+ sizeof(*key)));
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
|
|
|
+ if (key->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
|
|
|
+ * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
|
|
|
+ "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode\n");
|
|
|
+ } else if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
|
|
|
+ "unexpected type %d in RSN mode\n",
|
|
|
+ key->type);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
|
|
|
+ "unexpected type %d in WPA mode\n",
|
|
|
+ key->type);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key->key_nonce,
|
|
|
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
|
|
|
+ key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
|
|
|
+ * are set */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if ((key_info & (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) ==
|
|
|
+ (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) {
|
|
|
+ if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
|
|
|
+ msg = SMK_ERROR;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ msg = SMK_M1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE) {
|
|
|
+ msg = SMK_M3;
|
|
|
+ } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
|
|
|
+ msg = REQUEST;
|
|
|
+ } else if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) {
|
|
|
+ msg = GROUP_2;
|
|
|
+ } else if (key_data_length == 0) {
|
|
|
+ msg = PAIRWISE_4;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ msg = PAIRWISE_2;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
|
|
|
+ if (msg == REQUEST || msg == PAIRWISE_2 || msg == PAIRWISE_4 ||
|
|
|
+ msg == GROUP_2) {
|
|
|
+ u16 ver = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP ||
|
|
|
+ sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) {
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
|
|
|
+ ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
|
|
|
+ ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
|
|
|
+ if (sm->req_replay_counter_used &&
|
|
|
+ memcmp(key->replay_counter, sm->req_replay_counter,
|
|
|
+ WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) <= 0) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) &&
|
|
|
+ !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->key_replay, key->replay_counter)) {
|
|
|
+ int i;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
|
|
|
+ wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
|
|
|
+ key->replay_counter) &&
|
|
|
+ sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING &&
|
|
|
+ memcmp(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0)
|
|
|
+ {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
|
|
|
+ * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
|
|
|
+ * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
|
|
|
+ * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
|
|
|
+ * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ sm->update_snonce = 1;
|
|
|
+ wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->prev_key_replay,
|
|
|
+ key->replay_counter);
|
|
|
+ goto continue_processing;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
|
|
|
+ wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
|
|
|
+ key->replay_counter) &&
|
|
|
+ sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING) {
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
|
|
|
+ if (!sm->key_replay[i].valid)
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "pending replay counter",
|
|
|
+ sm->key_replay[i].counter,
|
|
|
+ WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "received replay counter",
|
|
|
+ key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+continue_processing:
|
|
|
+ switch (msg) {
|
|
|
+ case PAIRWISE_2:
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKSTART &&
|
|
|
+ sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING &&
|
|
|
+ (!sm->update_snonce ||
|
|
|
+ sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING)) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ random_add_randomness(key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
|
|
|
+ * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
|
|
|
+ * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
|
|
|
+ * information from it. Once enough entropy is
|
|
|
+ * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
|
|
|
+ * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
|
|
|
+ * continue.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
|
|
|
+ "collect more entropy for random number "
|
|
|
+ "generation");
|
|
|
+ random_mark_pool_ready();
|
|
|
+ wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_parse_kde_ies((u8 *) (key + 1), key_data_length,
|
|
|
+ &kde) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (kde.rsn_ie) {
|
|
|
+ eapol_key_ie = kde.rsn_ie;
|
|
|
+ eapol_key_ie_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ eapol_key_ie = kde.wpa_ie;
|
|
|
+ eapol_key_ie_len = kde.wpa_ie_len;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ ft = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
|
|
|
+ wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa_ie == NULL ||
|
|
|
+ wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft,
|
|
|
+ sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len,
|
|
|
+ eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len)) {
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa_ie) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
|
|
|
+ sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
|
|
|
+ eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len);
|
|
|
+ /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
|
|
|
+ wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ if (ft && ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth, sm, &kde) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case PAIRWISE_4:
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING ||
|
|
|
+ !sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case GROUP_2:
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state != WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
|
|
|
+ || !sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
|
|
|
+ case SMK_M1:
|
|
|
+ case SMK_M3:
|
|
|
+ case SMK_ERROR:
|
|
|
+ if (!wpa_auth->conf.peerkey) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
|
|
|
+ "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (!sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+#else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
|
+ case SMK_M1:
|
|
|
+ case SMK_M3:
|
|
|
+ case SMK_ERROR:
|
|
|
+ return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
|
+ case REQUEST:
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->MICVerified = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->PTK_valid && !sm->update_snonce) {
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&sm->PTK, data, data_len)) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ sm->MICVerified = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
|
+ ets_timer_disarm(&sm->resend_eapol);
|
|
|
+ ets_timer_done(&sm->resend_eapol);
|
|
|
+ sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
|
|
|
+ if (sm->MICVerified) {
|
|
|
+ sm->req_replay_counter_used = 1;
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->req_replay_counter, key->replay_counter,
|
|
|
+ WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
|
|
|
+ * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
|
|
|
+ * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ if (msg == SMK_ERROR) {
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
|
|
|
+ wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth, sm, key);
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_receive_error_report(
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
|
+ !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) > 0)
|
|
|
+ return; /* STA entry was removed */
|
|
|
+ } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
|
|
|
+ } else if (msg == SMK_M1) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth, sm, key);
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
|
+ } else if (key_data_length > 0 &&
|
|
|
+ wpa_parse_kde_ies((const u8 *) (key + 1),
|
|
|
+ key_data_length, &kde) == 0 &&
|
|
|
+ kde.mac_addr) {
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
|
+ wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth, NULL);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
|
|
|
+ wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay,
|
|
|
+ key->replay_counter);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (msg == PAIRWISE_2) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
|
|
|
+ * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
|
|
|
+ * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
|
|
|
+ * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
|
|
|
+ * unexpected supplicant behavior.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->prev_key_replay, sm->key_replay,
|
|
|
+ sizeof(sm->key_replay));
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ memset(sm->prev_key_replay, 0,
|
|
|
+ sizeof(sm->prev_key_replay));
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
|
|
|
+ * do not get copied again.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay, NULL);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
|
|
|
+ if (msg == SMK_M3) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth, sm, key);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_rx: free eapol=%p\n", sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
|
|
|
+ os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
|
|
|
+ sm->last_rx_eapol_key = (u8 *)os_malloc(data_len);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->last_rx_eapol_key == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_rx: new eapol=%p\n", sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->last_rx_eapol_key, data, data_len);
|
|
|
+ sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len = data_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->rx_eapol_key_secure = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE);
|
|
|
+ sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
|
|
|
+ sm->EAPOLKeyRequest = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8 *gmk, const char *label, const u8 *addr,
|
|
|
+ const u8 *gnonce, u8 *gtk, size_t gtk_len)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ u8 data[ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN + 8 + 16];
|
|
|
+ u8 *pos;
|
|
|
+ int ret = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
|
|
|
+ * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
|
|
|
+ * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
|
|
|
+ * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
|
|
|
+ * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
|
|
|
+ * exactly same.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ memcpy(data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, gnonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ pos = data + ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
|
+ wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos);
|
|
|
+ pos += 8;
|
|
|
+ if (os_get_random(pos, 16) < 0)
|
|
|
+ ret = -1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
+ fast_sha256_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len);
|
|
|
+#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
+ if (sha1_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
|
|
|
+ ret = -1;
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
|
+ sm->TimeoutEvt = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
|
|
|
+ const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
|
|
|
+ const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
|
|
|
+ int keyidx, int encr, int force_version)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
|
+ size_t len;
|
|
|
+ int alg;
|
|
|
+ int key_data_len, pad_len = 0;
|
|
|
+ u8 *buf, *pos;
|
|
|
+ int version, pairwise;
|
|
|
+ int i;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_auth=%p sm=%p kdersc=%p kde=%p nounce=%p kde_len=%u keyidx=%d encr=%d force=%d\n",
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth,sm, key_rsc, kde, nonce, kde_len, keyidx, encr, force_version);
|
|
|
+ len = sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr) + sizeof(struct wpa_eapol_key);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (force_version)
|
|
|
+ version = force_version;
|
|
|
+ else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm))
|
|
|
+ version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC;
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
|
|
|
+ version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES;
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
|
|
|
+ "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
|
|
|
+ "encr=%d)\n",
|
|
|
+ version,
|
|
|
+ (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
|
+ (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
|
+ (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
|
+ (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
|
+ pairwise, (unsigned long) kde_len, keyidx, encr);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ key_data_len = kde_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if ((version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
|
|
|
+ version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) && encr) {
|
|
|
+ pad_len = key_data_len % 8;
|
|
|
+ if (pad_len)
|
|
|
+ pad_len = 8 - pad_len;
|
|
|
+ key_data_len += pad_len + 8;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ len += key_data_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *)os_zalloc(len);
|
|
|
+ if (hdr == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ hdr->version = wpa_auth->conf.eapol_version;
|
|
|
+ hdr->type = IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY;
|
|
|
+ hdr->length = host_to_be16(len - sizeof(*hdr));
|
|
|
+ key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ key->type = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
|
|
|
+ EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN : EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA;
|
|
|
+ key_info |= version;
|
|
|
+ if (encr && sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
|
|
|
+ key_info |= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
|
|
|
+ key_info |= keyidx << WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT;
|
|
|
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_info, key_info);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ alg = pairwise ? sm->pairwise : wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group;
|
|
|
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg));
|
|
|
+ if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE)
|
|
|
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 0);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
|
|
|
+ for (i = RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES - 1; i > 0; i--) {
|
|
|
+ sm->key_replay[i].valid = sm->key_replay[i - 1].valid;
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->key_replay[i].counter,
|
|
|
+ sm->key_replay[i - 1].counter,
|
|
|
+ WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ inc_byte_array(sm->key_replay[0].counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(key->replay_counter, sm->key_replay[0].counter,
|
|
|
+ WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
|
|
|
+ sm->key_replay[0].valid = TRUE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (nonce)
|
|
|
+ memcpy(key->key_nonce, nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (key_rsc)
|
|
|
+ memcpy(key->key_rsc, key_rsc, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (kde && !encr) {
|
|
|
+ memcpy(key + 1, kde, kde_len);
|
|
|
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, kde_len);
|
|
|
+ } else if (encr && kde) {
|
|
|
+ buf = (u8 *)os_zalloc(key_data_len);
|
|
|
+ if (buf == NULL) {
|
|
|
+ os_free(hdr);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ pos = buf;
|
|
|
+ memcpy(pos, kde, kde_len);
|
|
|
+ pos += kde_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (pad_len)
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = 0xdd;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
|
|
|
+ buf, key_data_len);
|
|
|
+ if (version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
|
|
|
+ version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
|
|
|
+ if (fast_aes_wrap(sm->PTK.kek, (key_data_len - 8) / 8, buf,
|
|
|
+ (u8 *) (key + 1))) {
|
|
|
+ os_free(hdr);
|
|
|
+ os_free(buf);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, key_data_len);
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ u8 ek[32];
|
|
|
+ memcpy(key->key_iv,
|
|
|
+ sm->group->Counter + WPA_NONCE_LEN - 16, 16);
|
|
|
+ inc_byte_array(sm->group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(ek, key->key_iv, 16);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(ek + 16, sm->PTK.kek, 16);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(key + 1, buf, key_data_len);
|
|
|
+ rc4_skip(ek, 32, 256, (u8 *) (key + 1), key_data_len);
|
|
|
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, key_data_len);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ os_free(buf);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) {
|
|
|
+ if (!sm->PTK_valid) {
|
|
|
+ os_free(hdr);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->PTK.kck, version, (u8 *) hdr, len,
|
|
|
+ key->key_mic);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx, 1);
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr, (u8 *) hdr, len, sm->pairwise_set);
|
|
|
+ os_free(hdr);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+int hostap_eapol_resend_process(void *timeout_ctx)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ u32 index = (u32)timeout_ctx;
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_state_machine *sm = wpa_auth_get_sm(index);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "resend eapol1");
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(sm) {
|
|
|
+ sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
|
+ sm->TimeoutEvt = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ sm->in_step_loop = 0;
|
|
|
+ wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_INFO, "Station left, stop send EAPOL frame");
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return ESP_OK;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+void resend_eapol_handle(void *timeout_ctx)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ wifi_ipc_config_t cfg;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ cfg.fn = hostap_eapol_resend_process;
|
|
|
+ cfg.arg = timeout_ctx;
|
|
|
+ cfg.arg_size = 0;
|
|
|
+ esp_wifi_ipc_internal(&cfg, false);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
|
|
|
+ const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
|
|
|
+ const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
|
|
|
+ int keyidx, int encr)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ int timeout_ms;
|
|
|
+ int pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
|
|
|
+ int ctr;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm, key_info, key_rsc, nonce, kde, kde_len,
|
|
|
+ keyidx, encr, 0);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ctr = pairwise ? sm->TimeoutCtr : sm->GTimeoutCtr;
|
|
|
+ if (ctr == 1 && wpa_auth->conf.tx_status)
|
|
|
+ timeout_ms = pairwise ? eapol_key_timeout_first :
|
|
|
+ eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
|
|
|
+ if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
|
|
|
+ sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
|
|
|
+ "counter %d)\n", timeout_ms, ctr);
|
|
|
+ eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000, (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
|
|
|
+ wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
|
+ ets_timer_disarm(&sm->resend_eapol);
|
|
|
+ ets_timer_setfn(&sm->resend_eapol, (ETSTimerFunc *)resend_eapol_handle, (void*)(sm->index));
|
|
|
+ ets_timer_arm(&sm->resend_eapol, 1000, 0);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
|
|
|
+ u16 key_info;
|
|
|
+ int ret = 0;
|
|
|
+ int mic_ret = 0;
|
|
|
+ u8 mic[16];
|
|
|
+ char debug_log[8];
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key)){
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "invalid data length, len=%u\n", data_len);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
|
|
|
+ key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
|
+ key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(mic, key->key_mic, 16);
|
|
|
+ memset(key->key_mic, 0, 16);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ mic_ret = wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK->kck, key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK, data, data_len, key->key_mic);
|
|
|
+ if ( mic_ret || memcmp(mic, key->key_mic, 16) != 0) {
|
|
|
+ ret = -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ os_memset(debug_log, 0, 8);
|
|
|
+ os_memcpy(debug_log, "you mic", sizeof("you mic"));
|
|
|
+ wpa_dump_mem(debug_log, mic, 16);
|
|
|
+ os_memset(debug_log, 0, 8);
|
|
|
+ os_memcpy(debug_log, "my mic", sizeof("my mic"));
|
|
|
+ wpa_dump_mem(debug_log, key->key_mic, 16);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(key->key_mic, mic, 16);
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE, sm->addr, 0, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
+ sm->pairwise_set = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ int remove_ptk = 1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ switch (event) {
|
|
|
+ case WPA_AUTH:
|
|
|
+ case WPA_ASSOC:
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_DEAUTH:
|
|
|
+ case WPA_DISASSOC:
|
|
|
+ sm->DeauthenticationRequest = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_REAUTH:
|
|
|
+ case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL:
|
|
|
+ if (!sm->started) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
|
|
|
+ * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
|
|
|
+ * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
|
|
|
+ * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
|
|
|
+ * properly at this point.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA state machine had not been "
|
|
|
+ "started - initialize now");
|
|
|
+ sm->started = 1;
|
|
|
+ sm->Init = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
|
|
|
+ return 1; /* should not really happen */
|
|
|
+ sm->Init = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
|
|
|
+ * update for this STA.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
|
+ sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ sm->PtkGroupInit = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_ASSOC_FT:
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
|
|
|
+ "after association");
|
|
|
+ wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
|
|
|
+ sm->ft_completed = 1;
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ sm->ft_completed = 0;
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
+ if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot && event == WPA_AUTH)
|
|
|
+ remove_ptk = 0;
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (remove_ptk) {
|
|
|
+ sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (event != WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL)
|
|
|
+ wpa_remove_ptk(sm);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->Init) {
|
|
|
+ /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
|
|
|
+ * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
|
|
|
+ sm->changed = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->keycount = 0;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
|
|
|
+ sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
|
+ sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
|
|
|
+ sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
|
|
|
+ * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
|
|
|
+ sm->Pair = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 0);
|
|
|
+ wpa_remove_ptk(sm);
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 0);
|
|
|
+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
|
+ WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 0);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+ sm->Disconnect = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+ sm->DeauthenticationRequest = FALSE;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+ memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
|
|
|
+ sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto,
|
|
|
+ 1);
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 1);
|
|
|
+ sm->AuthenticationRequest = FALSE;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ if (group->first_sta_seen)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
|
|
|
+ * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
|
|
|
+ * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
|
|
|
+ * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
|
|
|
+ * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
|
|
|
+ "station\n");
|
|
|
+ if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
|
|
|
+ "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
|
|
|
+ group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ group->first_sta_seen = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
+ wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
+ wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_group_ensure_init(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
|
|
|
+ * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
|
|
|
+ * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
|
|
|
+ * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
|
|
|
+ * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
|
|
|
+ * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
|
|
|
+ * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ if (os_get_random(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_ERROR, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
|
|
|
+ "ANonce.");
|
|
|
+ wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm->ANonce,
|
|
|
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
|
|
|
+ * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
|
|
|
+ * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
|
|
|
+ * INITIALIZE. */
|
|
|
+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
|
|
|
+ size_t len = 2 * PMK_LEN;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPMK, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ sm->xxkey_len = 0;
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, msk, &len) == 0) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
|
|
|
+ "(len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->PMK, msk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ if (len >= 2 * PMK_LEN) {
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->xxkey, msk + PMK_LEN, PMK_LEN);
|
|
|
+ sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Could not get PMK");
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
|
|
|
+ /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
|
|
|
+ * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
|
|
|
+ * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
|
|
|
+ * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
|
|
|
+ * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
|
|
|
+ * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
|
|
|
+ * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
|
|
|
+ * be good workaround for this issue. */
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun, 0);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPSK)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ const u8 *psk;
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPSK, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+ psk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, NULL);
|
|
|
+ if (psk) {
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->PMK, psk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->xxkey, psk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
|
+ sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ u8 buf[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN], *pmkid = NULL;
|
|
|
+ size_t pmkid_len = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+ sm->PTKRequest = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->TimeoutCtr++;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
|
|
|
+ /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
|
|
|
+ * immediately following this. */
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
|
|
|
+ * one possible PSK for this STA.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
|
|
|
+ wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
|
+ pmkid = buf;
|
|
|
+ pmkid_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
|
|
|
+ pmkid[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
|
|
|
+ pmkid[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
|
|
|
+ RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
|
|
|
+ * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ rsn_pmkid(sm->PMK, PMK_LEN, sm->wpa_auth->addr,
|
|
|
+ sm->addr, &pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
|
|
|
+ wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt));
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
|
+ WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE, NULL,
|
|
|
+ sm->ANonce, pmkid, pmkid_len, 0, 0);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_ptk *ptk)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ size_t ptk_len = sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP ? 48 : 64;
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
|
|
|
+ return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm, pmk, ptk, ptk_len);
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, PMK_LEN, "Pairwise key expansion",
|
|
|
+ sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, sm->ANonce, sm->SNonce,
|
|
|
+ (u8 *) ptk, ptk_len,
|
|
|
+ wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_ptk PTK;
|
|
|
+ int ok = 0;
|
|
|
+ const u8 *pmk = NULL;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+ sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ sm->update_snonce = FALSE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
|
|
|
+ * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
|
|
|
+ * the packet */
|
|
|
+ for (;;) {
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "wpa psk\n");
|
|
|
+ pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, pmk);
|
|
|
+ if (pmk == NULL){
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "pmk is null\n");
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ pmk = sm->PMK;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_derive_ptk(sm, pmk, &PTK);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&PTK, sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
|
|
|
+ sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len) == 0) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "mic verify ok, pmk=%p\n", pmk);
|
|
|
+ ok = 1;
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "mic verify fail, pmk=%p\n", pmk);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)){
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_key_mgmt=%x\n", sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!ok) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
|
|
|
+ * with the value we derived.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ if (memcmp(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, sm->pmk_r1_name,
|
|
|
+ WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
|
|
|
+ "Supplicant",
|
|
|
+ sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
|
|
|
+ sm->pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
|
|
|
+ eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
|
+ /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
|
|
|
+ * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, PMK_LEN);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->MICVerified = TRUE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK));
|
|
|
+ sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot) {
|
|
|
+ return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + sizeof(struct wpa_igtk_kde);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk;
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!sm->mgmt_frame_prot)
|
|
|
+ return pos;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ igtk.keyid[0] = gsm->GN_igtk;
|
|
|
+ igtk.keyid[1] = 0;
|
|
|
+ if (gsm->wpa_group_state != WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE ||
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, igtk.pn) < 0)
|
|
|
+ memset(igtk.pn, 0, sizeof(igtk.pn));
|
|
|
+ memcpy(igtk.igtk, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
|
|
|
+ * IGTK in the BSS.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ if (os_get_random(igtk.igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0)
|
|
|
+ return pos;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK,
|
|
|
+ (const u8 *) &igtk, sizeof(igtk), NULL, 0);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return pos;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return pos;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN], *_rsc, *gtk, *kde, *pos, dummy_gtk[32];
|
|
|
+ size_t gtk_len, kde_len;
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
|
+ u8 *wpa_ie;
|
|
|
+ int wpa_ie_len, secure, keyidx, encr = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+ sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->TimeoutCtr++;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
|
|
|
+ /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
|
|
|
+ * immediately following this. */
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
|
|
|
+ GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
|
|
|
+ /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
|
|
|
+ wpa_ie = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
|
|
|
+ wpa_ie_len = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA &&
|
|
|
+ (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN) &&
|
|
|
+ wpa_ie_len > wpa_ie[1] + 2 && wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN) {
|
|
|
+ /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE */
|
|
|
+ wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
|
+ wpa_ie_len = wpa_ie[1] + 2;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
|
|
|
+ /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
|
|
|
+ secure = 1;
|
|
|
+ gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
|
|
|
+ gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
|
|
|
+ * of GTK in the BSS.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ if (os_get_random(dummy_gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ gtk = dummy_gtk;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ keyidx = gsm->GN;
|
|
|
+ _rsc = rsc;
|
|
|
+ encr = 1;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
|
|
|
+ secure = 0;
|
|
|
+ gtk = NULL;
|
|
|
+ gtk_len = 0;
|
|
|
+ keyidx = 0;
|
|
|
+ _rsc = NULL;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->rx_eapol_key_secure) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
|
|
|
+ * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
|
|
|
+ * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
|
|
|
+ * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
|
|
|
+ * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
|
|
|
+ * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ secure = 1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ kde_len = wpa_ie_len + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
|
|
|
+ if (gtk)
|
|
|
+ kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gtk_len;
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
|
+ kde_len += 2 + PMKID_LEN; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
|
|
|
+ kde_len += 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+ kde = (u8 *)os_malloc(kde_len);
|
|
|
+ if (kde == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ pos = kde;
|
|
|
+ memcpy(pos, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len);
|
|
|
+ pos += wpa_ie_len;
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
|
+ int res = wpa_insert_pmkid(kde, pos - kde, sm->pmk_r1_name);
|
|
|
+ if (res < 0) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert "
|
|
|
+ "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
|
|
|
+ os_free(kde);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ pos += res;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+ if (gtk) {
|
|
|
+ u8 hdr[2];
|
|
|
+ hdr[0] = keyidx & 0x03;
|
|
|
+ hdr[1] = 0;
|
|
|
+ pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
|
|
|
+ gtk, gtk_len);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
|
+ int res;
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_auth_config *conf;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
|
|
|
+ res = wpa_write_ftie(conf, conf->r0_key_holder,
|
|
|
+ conf->r0_key_holder_len,
|
|
|
+ NULL, NULL, pos, kde + kde_len - pos,
|
|
|
+ NULL, 0);
|
|
|
+ if (res < 0) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
|
|
|
+ "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
|
|
|
+ os_free(kde);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ pos += res;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = 5;
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE;
|
|
|
+ WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->reassociation_deadline);
|
|
|
+ pos += 4;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = 5;
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME;
|
|
|
+ WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->r0_key_lifetime * 60);
|
|
|
+ pos += 4;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
|
+ (secure ? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE : 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC |
|
|
|
+ WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL |
|
|
|
+ WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE,
|
|
|
+ _rsc, sm->ANonce, kde, pos - kde, keyidx, encr);
|
|
|
+ os_free(kde);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE, wpa_ptk);
|
|
|
+ sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->Pair) {
|
|
|
+ enum wpa_alg alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise);
|
|
|
+ int klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise);
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, 0,
|
|
|
+ sm->PTK.tk1, klen)) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
|
|
|
+ sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey) {
|
|
|
+ eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
|
+ eloop_register_timeout(sm->wpa_auth->conf.
|
|
|
+ wpa_ptk_rekey, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk,
|
|
|
+ sm->wpa_auth, sm);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
|
+ WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 1);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
|
|
|
+ sm->keycount++;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->keycount == 2) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
|
+ WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 1);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid,
|
|
|
+ 1);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable, 0);
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone, 1);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
|
|
|
+ sm->PInitAKeys = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ sm->has_GTK = TRUE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ esp_wifi_wpa_ptk_init_done_internal(sm->addr);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
+ wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm->Init)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->Disconnect
|
|
|
+ /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->DeauthenticationRequest)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->AuthenticationRequest)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->PTKRequest)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
|
+ else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED:
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION:
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2:
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
|
+ WPA_EAPOL_keyRun) > 0)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPMK);
|
|
|
+ else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)
|
|
|
+ /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPSK);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_INITPMK:
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
|
|
|
+ WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable) > 0)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
|
+ else {
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_INITPSK:
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, NULL))
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
|
+ else {
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART:
|
|
|
+ if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
|
+ sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
|
|
|
+ (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
|
+ } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING:
|
|
|
+ if (sm->MICVerified)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
|
+ sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2:
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING:
|
|
|
+ if (sm->update_snonce)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
|
+ sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
|
|
|
+ (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
|
|
|
+ } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE:
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->Init) {
|
|
|
+ /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
|
|
|
+ * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
|
|
|
+ sm->changed = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
|
+ u8 *kde, *pos, hdr[2];
|
|
|
+ size_t kde_len;
|
|
|
+ u8 *gtk, dummy_gtk[32];
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->GTimeoutCtr++;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) {
|
|
|
+ /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
|
|
|
+ * immediately following this. */
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
|
|
|
+ sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
|
|
|
+ memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
|
+ if (gsm->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE)
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
|
|
|
+ * of GTK in the BSS.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ if (os_get_random(dummy_gtk, gsm->GTK_len) < 0)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ gtk = dummy_gtk;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
|
|
|
+ kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gsm->GTK_len +
|
|
|
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
|
|
|
+ kde = (u8 *)os_malloc(kde_len);
|
|
|
+ if (kde == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ pos = kde;
|
|
|
+ hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
|
|
|
+ hdr[1] = 0;
|
|
|
+ pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
|
|
|
+ gtk, gsm->GTK_len);
|
|
|
+ pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ kde = gtk;
|
|
|
+ pos = kde + gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
|
|
|
+ WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC |
|
|
|
+ WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK |
|
|
|
+ (!sm->Pair ? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL : 0),
|
|
|
+ rsc, gsm->GNonce, kde, pos - kde, gsm->GN, 1);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
|
|
|
+ os_free(kde);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
|
+ sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
|
|
|
+ sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
|
+ sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
|
|
|
+ /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
|
|
|
+ sm->has_GTK = TRUE;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR, wpa_ptk_group);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
|
|
|
+ sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
|
|
|
+ sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ if (sm->Init || sm->PtkGroupInit) {
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
|
|
|
+ sm->PtkGroupInit = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state) {
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE:
|
|
|
+ if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys ||
|
|
|
+ (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && sm->PInitAKeys))
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING:
|
|
|
+ if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
|
|
|
+ !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
|
|
|
+ (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
|
|
|
+ else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR:
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED:
|
|
|
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ int ret = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "Group key expansion",
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
|
|
|
+ group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
|
|
|
+ ret = -1;
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GTK",
|
|
|
+ group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
|
|
|
+ memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "IGTK key expansion",
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
|
|
|
+ group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4],
|
|
|
+ WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0)
|
|
|
+ ret = -1;
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "IGTK",
|
|
|
+ group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
|
|
|
+ "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)\n", group->vlan_id);
|
|
|
+ group->changed = FALSE; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
|
|
|
+ group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* GTK[0..N] = 0 */
|
|
|
+ memset(group->GTK, 0, sizeof(group->GTK));
|
|
|
+ group->GN = 1;
|
|
|
+ group->GM = 2;
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
+ group->GN_igtk = 4;
|
|
|
+ group->GM_igtk = 5;
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
+ /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
|
|
|
+ wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ if (ctx != NULL && ctx != sm->group)
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE) {
|
|
|
+ sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
|
|
|
+ * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
|
|
|
+ * station needs to be counted here anyway.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
|
|
|
+ if (sm->is_wnmsleep)
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->group->GKeyDoneStations++;
|
|
|
+ sm->GUpdateStationKeys = TRUE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_sm_step(sm);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_WNM
|
|
|
+/* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
|
|
|
+void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ if (sm->is_wnmsleep)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_group_update_sta(sm, NULL);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int flag)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ sm->is_wnmsleep = !!flag;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
|
+ u8 *start = pos;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * GTK subelement:
|
|
|
+ * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
|
|
|
+ * Key[5..32]
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK;
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = 11 + gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
|
+ /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
|
|
|
+ WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN & 0x03);
|
|
|
+ pos += 2;
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, pos) != 0)
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ pos += 8;
|
|
|
+ memcpy(pos, gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
|
|
|
+ pos += gsm->GTK_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
|
+ gsm->GN);
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
|
+ gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return pos - start;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
+int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
|
|
|
+ u8 *start = pos;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * IGTK subelement:
|
|
|
+ * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK;
|
|
|
+ *pos++ = 2 + 6 + WPA_IGTK_LEN;
|
|
|
+ WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN_igtk);
|
|
|
+ pos += 2;
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, pos) != 0)
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ pos += 6;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(pos, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
|
|
|
+ pos += WPA_IGTK_LEN;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
|
+ gsm->GN_igtk);
|
|
|
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
|
|
|
+ gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return pos - start;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ int tmp;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
|
|
|
+ "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)\n", group->vlan_id);
|
|
|
+ group->changed = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS;
|
|
|
+ group->GTKReKey = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ tmp = group->GM;
|
|
|
+ group->GM = group->GN;
|
|
|
+ group->GN = tmp;
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
+ tmp = group->GM_igtk;
|
|
|
+ group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
|
|
|
+ group->GN_igtk = tmp;
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
+ /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
|
|
|
+ * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
|
|
|
+ * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
|
|
|
+ wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (group->GKeyDoneStations) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
|
|
|
+ "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
|
|
|
+ group->GKeyDoneStations);
|
|
|
+ group->GKeyDoneStations = 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_update_sta, group);
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
|
|
|
+ group->GKeyDoneStations);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ int ret = 0;
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id,
|
|
|
+ wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group),
|
|
|
+ (uint8_t *)broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN,
|
|
|
+ group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
|
|
|
+ ret = -1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION &&
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, WPA_ALG_IGTK,
|
|
|
+ broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN_igtk,
|
|
|
+ group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4],
|
|
|
+ WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0)
|
|
|
+ ret = -1;
|
|
|
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
|
|
|
+ "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)\n", group->vlan_id);
|
|
|
+ group->changed = TRUE;
|
|
|
+ group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0)
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_group *group)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ if (group->GInit) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
+ } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT &&
|
|
|
+ group->GTKAuthenticator) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
+ } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE &&
|
|
|
+ group->GTKReKey) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
+ } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS) {
|
|
|
+ if (group->GKeyDoneStations == 0)
|
|
|
+ wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
+ else if (group->GTKReKey)
|
|
|
+ wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ if (sm == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm->in_step_loop) {
|
|
|
+ /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
|
|
|
+ * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
|
|
|
+ * recursive call. */
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_ERROR, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->in_step_loop = 1;
|
|
|
+ do {
|
|
|
+ if (sm->pending_deinit)
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sm->changed = FALSE;
|
|
|
+ sm->wpa_auth->group->changed = FALSE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->pending_deinit)
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP);
|
|
|
+ if (sm->pending_deinit)
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ wpa_group_sm_step(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
|
|
|
+ } while (sm->changed || sm->wpa_auth->group->changed);
|
|
|
+ sm->in_step_loop = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (sm->pending_deinit) {
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
|
|
|
+ "machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
|
|
|
+ wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
|
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+bool wpa_ap_join(void** sm, uint8_t *bssid, uint8_t *wpa_ie, uint8_t wpa_ie_len)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct hostapd_data *hapd = (struct hostapd_data*)esp_wifi_get_hostap_private_internal();
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_state_machine **wpa_sm;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!sm || !bssid || !wpa_ie){
|
|
|
+ return false;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_sm = (struct wpa_state_machine **)sm;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (hapd) {
|
|
|
+ if (hapd->wpa_auth->conf.wpa) {
|
|
|
+ if (*wpa_sm){
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_sta_deinit(*wpa_sm);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ *wpa_sm = wpa_auth_sta_init(hapd->wpa_auth, bssid);
|
|
|
+ wpa_printf( MSG_DEBUG, "init wpa sm=%p\n", *wpa_sm);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (*wpa_sm == NULL) {
|
|
|
+ return false;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (wpa_validate_wpa_ie(hapd->wpa_auth, *wpa_sm, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len)) {
|
|
|
+ return false;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_sta_associated(hapd->wpa_auth, *wpa_sm);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return true;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+bool wpa_ap_remove(void* sm)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct wpa_state_machine *wpa_sm;
|
|
|
+ if (!sm) return false;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ wpa_sm = (struct wpa_state_machine*)sm;
|
|
|
+ wpa_auth_sta_deinit(wpa_sm);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return true;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|