esp-idf/components/bootloader/Kconfig.projbuild

menu "Bootloader config"
    choice LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL
        bool "Bootloader log verbosity"
        default LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_INFO
        help
            Specify how much output to see in bootloader logs.

        config LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_NONE
            bool "No output"
        config LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_ERROR
            bool "Error"
        config LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_WARN
            bool "Warning"
        config LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_INFO
            bool "Info"
        config LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_DEBUG
            bool "Debug"
        config LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_VERBOSE
            bool "Verbose"
    endchoice

    config LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL
        int
        default 0 if LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_NONE
        default 1 if LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_ERROR
        default 2 if LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_WARN
        default 3 if LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_INFO
        default 4 if LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_DEBUG
        default 5 if LOG_BOOTLOADER_LEVEL_VERBOSE

    config BOOTLOADER_SPI_WP_PIN
        int "SPI Flash WP Pin when customising pins via eFuse (read help)"
        range 0 33
        default 7
        depends on FLASHMODE_QIO || FLASHMODE_QOUT
        help
            This value is ignored unless flash mode is set to QIO or QOUT *and* the SPI flash pins have been
            overriden by setting the eFuses SPI_PAD_CONFIG_xxx.

            When this is the case, the eFuse config only defines 3 of the 4 Quad I/O data pins. The WP pin (aka ESP32
            pin "SD_DATA_3" or SPI flash pin "IO2") is not specified in eFuse. That pin number is compiled into the
            bootloader instead.

            The default value (GPIO 7) is correct for WP pin on ESP32-D2WD integrated flash.

    choice BOOTLOADER_VDDSDIO_BOOST
        bool "VDDSDIO LDO voltage"
        default BOOTLOADER_VDDSDIO_BOOST_1_9V
        help
            If this option is enabled, and VDDSDIO LDO is set to 1.8V (using eFuse
            or MTDI bootstrapping pin), bootloader will change LDO settings to
            output 1.9V instead. This helps prevent flash chip from browning out
            during flash programming operations.

            This option has no effect if VDDSDIO is set to 3.3V, or if the internal
            VDDSDIO regulator is disabled via eFuse.

        config BOOTLOADER_VDDSDIO_BOOST_1_8V
            bool "1.8V"
            depends on !ESPTOOLPY_FLASHFREQ_80M
        config BOOTLOADER_VDDSDIO_BOOST_1_9V
            bool "1.9V"
    endchoice

    config BOOTLOADER_FACTORY_RESET
        bool "GPIO triggers factory reset"
        default N
        help
            Allows to reset the device to factory settings:
            - clear one or more data partitions;
            - boot from "factory" partition.
            The factory reset will occur if there is a GPIO input pulled low while device starts up.
            See settings below.

    config BOOTLOADER_NUM_PIN_FACTORY_RESET
        int "Number of the GPIO input for factory reset"
        depends on BOOTLOADER_FACTORY_RESET
        range 0 39
        default 4
        help
            The selected GPIO will be configured as an input with internal pull-up enabled.
            To trigger a factory reset, this GPIO must be pulled low on reset.
            Note that GPIO34-39 do not have an internal pullup and an external one must be provided.

    config BOOTLOADER_OTA_DATA_ERASE
        bool "Clear OTA data on factory reset (select factory partition)"
        depends on BOOTLOADER_FACTORY_RESET
        help
            The device will boot from "factory" partition (or OTA slot 0 if no factory partition is present) after a
            factory reset.

    config BOOTLOADER_DATA_FACTORY_RESET
        string "Comma-separated names of partitions to clear on factory reset"
        depends on BOOTLOADER_FACTORY_RESET
        default "nvs"
        help
            Allows customers to select which data partitions will be erased while factory reset.

            Specify the names of partitions as a comma-delimited with optional spaces for readability. (Like this:
            "nvs, phy_init, ...")
            Make sure that the name specified in the partition table and here are the same.
            Partitions of type "app" cannot be specified here.

    config BOOTLOADER_APP_TEST
        bool "GPIO triggers boot from test app partition"
        default N
        help
            Allows to run the test app from "TEST" partition.
            A boot from "test" partition will occur if there is a GPIO input pulled low while device starts up.
            See settings below.

    config BOOTLOADER_NUM_PIN_APP_TEST
        int "Number of the GPIO input to boot TEST partition"
        depends on BOOTLOADER_APP_TEST
        range 0 39
        default 18
        help
            The selected GPIO will be configured as an input with internal pull-up enabled.
            To trigger a test app, this GPIO must be pulled low on reset.
            After the GPIO input is deactivated and the device reboots, the old application will boot.
            (factory or OTA[x]).
            Note that GPIO34-39 do not have an internal pullup and an external one must be provided.

    config BOOTLOADER_HOLD_TIME_GPIO
        int "Hold time of GPIO for reset/test mode (seconds)"
        depends on BOOTLOADER_FACTORY_RESET || BOOTLOADER_APP_TEST
        default 5
        help
            The GPIO must be held low continuously for this period of time after reset
            before a factory reset or test partition boot (as applicable) is performed.

    config BOOTLOADER_WDT_ENABLE
        bool "Use RTC watchdog in start code"
        default y
        help
            Tracks the execution time of startup code.
            If the execution time is exceeded, the RTC_WDT will restart system.
            It is also useful to prevent a lock up in start code caused by an unstable power source.
            NOTE: Tracks the execution time starts from the bootloader code - re-set timeout, while selecting the
            source for slow_clk - and ends calling app_main.
            Re-set timeout is needed due to WDT uses a SLOW_CLK clock source. After changing a frequency slow_clk a
            time of WDT needs to re-set for new frequency.
            slow_clk depends on ESP32_RTC_CLOCK_SOURCE (INTERNAL_RC or EXTERNAL_CRYSTAL).

    config BOOTLOADER_WDT_DISABLE_IN_USER_CODE
        bool "Allows RTC watchdog disable in user code"
        depends on BOOTLOADER_WDT_ENABLE
        default n
        help
            If it is set, the client must itself reset or disable rtc_wdt in their code (app_main()).
            Otherwise rtc_wdt will be disabled before calling app_main function.
            Use function rtc_wdt_feed() for resetting counter of rtc_wdt.
            Use function rtc_wdt_disable() for disabling rtc_wdt.

    config BOOTLOADER_WDT_TIME_MS
        int "Timeout for RTC watchdog (ms)"
        depends on BOOTLOADER_WDT_ENABLE
        default 9000
        range 0 120000
        help
            Verify that this parameter is correct and more then the execution time.
            Pay attention to options such as reset to factory, trigger test partition and encryption on boot
            - these options can increase the execution time.
            Note: RTC_WDT will reset while encryption operations will be performed.

    config APP_ROLLBACK_ENABLE
        bool "Enable app rollback support"
        default n
        help
            After updating the app, the bootloader runs a new app with the "ESP_OTA_IMG_PENDING_VERIFY" state set.
            This state prevents the re-run of this app. After the first boot of the new app in the user code, the
            function should be called to confirm the operability of the app or vice versa about its non-operability.
            If the app is working, then it is marked as valid. Otherwise, it is marked as not valid and rolls back to
            the previous working app. A reboot is performed, and the app is booted before the software update.
            Note: If during the first boot a new app the power goes out or the WDT works, then roll back will happen.
            Rollback is possible only between the apps with the same security versions.

    config APP_ANTI_ROLLBACK
        bool "Enable app anti-rollback support"
        depends on APP_ROLLBACK_ENABLE
        default n
        help
            This option prevents rollback to previous firmware/application image with lower security version.

    config APP_SECURE_VERSION
        int "eFuse secure version of app"
        depends on APP_ANTI_ROLLBACK
        default 0
        help
            The secure version is the sequence number stored in the header of each firmware.
            The security version is set in the bootloader, version is recorded in the eFuse field
            as the number of set ones. The allocated number of bits in the efuse field
            for storing the security version is limited (see APP_SECURE_VERSION_SIZE_EFUSE_FIELD option).

            Bootloader: When bootloader selects an app to boot, an app is selected that has
            a security version greater or equal that recorded in eFuse field.
            The app is booted with a higher (or equal) secure version.

            The security version is worth increasing if in previous versions there is
            a significant vulnerability and their use is not acceptable.

            Your partition table should has a scheme with ota_0 + ota_1 (without factory).

    config APP_SECURE_VERSION_SIZE_EFUSE_FIELD
        int "Size of the efuse secure version field"
        depends on APP_ANTI_ROLLBACK
        range 1 32
        default 32
        help
            The size of the efuse secure version field. Its length is limited to 32 bits.
            This determines how many times the security version can be increased.

    config EFUSE_SECURE_VERSION_EMULATE
        bool "Emulate operations with efuse secure version(only test)"
        default n
        depends on APP_ANTI_ROLLBACK
        help
            This option allow emulate read/write operations with efuse secure version.
            It allow to test anti-rollback implemention without permanent write eFuse bits.
            In partition table should be exist this partition `emul_efuse, data, 5, , 0x2000`.

endmenu  # Bootloader


menu "Security features"
    visible if !IDF_CMAKE

    # These three are the actual options to check in code,
    # selected by the displayed options
    config SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT
        bool
        default y
        depends on SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED || SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT_NO_SECURE_BOOT

    config SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE
        bool
        default y
        depends on SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED || SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT

    config SECURE_SIGNED_APPS
        bool
        default y
        depends on SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT || SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE


    config SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT
        bool "Require signed app images"
        default n
        depends on !SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED
        help
            Require apps to be signed to verify their integrity.

            This option uses the same app signature scheme as hardware secure boot, but unlike hardware secure boot it
            does not prevent the bootloader from being physically updated. This means that the device can be secured
            against remote network access, but not physical access. Compared to using hardware Secure Boot this option
            is much simpler to implement.

    config SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT_NO_SECURE_BOOT
        bool "Bootloader verifies app signatures"
        default n
        depends on SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT
        help
            If this option is set, the bootloader will be compiled with code to verify that an app is signed before
            booting it.

            If hardware secure boot is enabled, this option is always enabled and cannot be disabled.
            If hardware secure boot is not enabled, this option doesn't add significant security by itself so most
            users will want to leave it disabled.

    config SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
        bool "Verify app signature on update"
        default y
        depends on SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT
        help
            If this option is set, any OTA updated apps will have the signature verified before being considered valid.

            When enabled, the signature is automatically checked whenever the esp_ota_ops.h APIs are used for OTA
            updates, or esp_image_format.h APIs are used to verify apps.

            If hardware secure boot is enabled, this option is always enabled and cannot be disabled.
            If hardware secure boot is not enabled, this option still adds significant security against network-based
            attackers by preventing spoofing of OTA updates.

    config SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED
        bool "Enable hardware secure boot in bootloader (READ DOCS FIRST)"
        default n
        help
            Build a bootloader which enables secure boot on first boot.

            Once enabled, secure boot will not boot a modified bootloader. The bootloader will only load a partition
            table or boot an app if the data has a verified digital signature. There are implications for reflashing
            updated apps once secure boot is enabled.

            When enabling secure boot, JTAG and ROM BASIC Interpreter are permanently disabled by default.

            Refer to https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/security/secure-boot.html before enabling.

    choice SECURE_BOOTLOADER_MODE
        bool "Secure bootloader mode"
        depends on SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED
        default SECURE_BOOTLOADER_ONE_TIME_FLASH

        config SECURE_BOOTLOADER_ONE_TIME_FLASH
            bool "One-time flash"
            help
                On first boot, the bootloader will generate a key which is not readable externally or by software. A
                digest is generated from the bootloader image itself. This digest will be verified on each subsequent
                boot.

                Enabling this option means that the bootloader cannot be changed after the first time it is booted.

        config SECURE_BOOTLOADER_REFLASHABLE
            bool "Reflashable"
            help
                Generate a reusable secure bootloader key, derived (via SHA-256) from the secure boot signing key.

                This allows the secure bootloader to be re-flashed by anyone with access to the secure boot signing
                key.

                This option is less secure than one-time flash, because a leak of the digest key from one device
                allows reflashing of any device that uses it.

    endchoice

    config SECURE_BOOT_BUILD_SIGNED_BINARIES
        bool "Sign binaries during build"
        depends on SECURE_SIGNED_APPS
        default y
        help
            Once secure boot or signed app requirement is enabled, app images are required to be signed.

            If enabled (default), these binary files are signed as part of the build process. The file named in
            "Secure boot private signing key" will be used to sign the image.

            If disabled, unsigned app/partition data will be built. They must be signed manually using espsecure.py
            (for example, on a remote signing server.)

    config SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY
        string "Secure boot private signing key"
        depends on SECURE_BOOT_BUILD_SIGNED_BINARIES
        default secure_boot_signing_key.pem
        help
            Path to the key file used to sign app images.

            Key file is an ECDSA private key (NIST256p curve) in PEM format.

            Path is evaluated relative to the project directory.

            You can generate a new signing key by running the following command:
            espsecure.py generate_signing_key secure_boot_signing_key.pem

            See https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/security/secure-boot.html for details.

    config SECURE_BOOT_VERIFICATION_KEY
        string "Secure boot public signature verification key"
        depends on SECURE_SIGNED_APPS && !SECURE_BOOT_BUILD_SIGNED_BINARIES
        default signature_verification_key.bin
        help
            Path to a public key file used to verify signed images. This key is compiled into the bootloader and/or
            app, to verify app images.

            Key file is in raw binary format, and can be extracted from a
            PEM formatted private key using the espsecure.py
            extract_public_key command.

            Refer to https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/security/secure-boot.html before enabling.

    choice SECURE_BOOTLOADER_KEY_ENCODING
        bool "Hardware Key Encoding"
        depends on SECURE_BOOTLOADER_REFLASHABLE
        default SECURE_BOOTLOADER_NO_ENCODING
        help

            In reflashable secure bootloader mode, a hardware key is derived from the signing key (with SHA-256) and
            can be written to eFuse with espefuse.py.

            Normally this is a 256-bit key, but if 3/4 Coding Scheme is used on the device then the eFuse key is
            truncated to 192 bits.

            This configuration item doesn't change any firmware code, it only changes the size of key binary which is
            generated at build time.

        config SECURE_BOOTLOADER_KEY_ENCODING_256BIT
            bool "No encoding (256 bit key)"

        config SECURE_BOOTLOADER_KEY_ENCODING_192BIT
            bool "3/4 encoding (192 bit key)"

    endchoice

    config SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE
        bool "Allow potentially insecure options"
        depends on SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED
        default N
        help
            You can disable some of the default protections offered by secure boot, in order to enable testing or a
            custom combination of security features.

            Only enable these options if you are very sure.

            Refer to https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/security/secure-boot.html before enabling.

    config FLASH_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED
        bool "Enable flash encryption on boot (READ DOCS FIRST)"
        default N
        help
            If this option is set, flash contents will be encrypted by the bootloader on first boot.

            Note: After first boot, the system will be permanently encrypted. Re-flashing an encrypted
            system is complicated and not always possible.

            Read https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/security/flash-encryption.html before enabling.

    config FLASH_ENCRYPTION_INSECURE
        bool "Allow potentially insecure options"
        depends on FLASH_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED
        default N
        help
            You can disable some of the default protections offered by flash encryption, in order to enable testing or
            a custom combination of security features.

            Only enable these options if you are very sure.

            Refer to https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/security/secure-boot.html and
            https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/security/flash-encryption.html for details.

    menu "Potentially insecure options"
        visible if FLASH_ENCRYPTION_INSECURE || SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE

        # NOTE: Options in this menu NEED to have SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE
        # and/or FLASH_ENCRYPTION_INSECURE in "depends on", as the menu
        # itself doesn't enable/disable its children (if it's not set,
        # it's possible for the insecure menu to be disabled but the insecure option
        # to remain on which is very bad.)

        config SECURE_BOOT_ALLOW_ROM_BASIC
            bool "Leave ROM BASIC Interpreter available on reset"
            depends on SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE || FLASH_ENCRYPTION_INSECURE
            default N
            help
                By default, the BASIC ROM Console starts on reset if no valid bootloader is
                read from the flash.

                When either flash encryption or secure boot are enabled, the default is to
                disable this BASIC fallback mode permanently via eFuse.

                If this option is set, this eFuse is not burned and the BASIC ROM Console may
                remain accessible.  Only set this option in testing environments.

        config SECURE_BOOT_ALLOW_JTAG
            bool "Allow JTAG Debugging"
            depends on SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE || FLASH_ENCRYPTION_INSECURE
            default N
            help
                If not set (default), the bootloader will permanently disable JTAG (across entire chip) on first boot
                when either secure boot or flash encryption is enabled.

                Setting this option leaves JTAG on for debugging, which negates all protections of flash encryption
                and some of the protections of secure boot.

                Only set this option in testing environments.

        config SECURE_BOOT_ALLOW_SHORT_APP_PARTITION
            bool "Allow app partition length not 64KB aligned"
            depends on SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE
            help
                If not set (default), app partition size must be a multiple of 64KB. App images are padded to 64KB
                length, and the bootloader checks any trailing bytes after the signature (before the next 64KB
                boundary) have not been written. This is because flash cache maps entire 64KB pages into the address
                space. This prevents an attacker from appending unverified data after the app image in the flash,
                causing it to be mapped into the address space.

                Setting this option allows the app partition length to be unaligned, and disables padding of the app
                image to this length. It is generally not recommended to set this option, unless you have a legacy
                partitioning scheme which doesn't support 64KB aligned partition lengths.

        config FLASH_ENCRYPTION_UART_BOOTLOADER_ALLOW_ENCRYPT
            bool "Leave UART bootloader encryption enabled"
            depends on FLASH_ENCRYPTION_INSECURE
            default N
            help
                If not set (default), the bootloader will permanently disable UART bootloader encryption access on
                first boot. If set, the UART bootloader will still be able to access hardware encryption.

                It is recommended to only set this option in testing environments.

        config FLASH_ENCRYPTION_UART_BOOTLOADER_ALLOW_DECRYPT
            bool "Leave UART bootloader decryption enabled"
            depends on FLASH_ENCRYPTION_INSECURE
            default N
            help
                If not set (default), the bootloader will permanently disable UART bootloader decryption access on
                first boot. If set, the UART bootloader will still be able to access hardware decryption.

                Only set this option in testing environments. Setting this option allows complete bypass of flash
                encryption.

        config FLASH_ENCRYPTION_UART_BOOTLOADER_ALLOW_CACHE
            bool "Leave UART bootloader flash cache enabled"
            depends on FLASH_ENCRYPTION_INSECURE
            default N
            help
                If not set (default), the bootloader will permanently disable UART bootloader flash cache access on
                first boot. If set, the UART bootloader will still be able to access the flash cache.

                Only set this option in testing environments.

    endmenu  # Potentially Insecure

    config FLASH_ENCRYPTION_DISABLE_PLAINTEXT
        bool "Disable serial reflashing of plaintext firmware"
        depends on FLASH_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED
        default y if SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED
        default n if !SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED
        help
            If this option is enabled, flash encryption is permanently enabled after first boot by write-protecting
            the FLASH_CRYPT_CNT efuse. This is the recommended configuration for a secure production system.

            If this option is disabled, FLASH_CRYPT_CNT is left writeable and up to 4 plaintext re-flashes are allowed.
            An attacker with physical access will be able to read out encrypted flash contents until all plaintext
            re-flashes have been used up.

            If this option is disabled and hardware Secure Boot is enabled, Secure Boot must be configured in
            Reflashable mode so that a new Secure Boot digest can be flashed at the same time as plaintext firmware.
            This combination is not secure and should not be used for a production system.

    config SECURE_DISABLE_ROM_DL_MODE
        bool "Permanently disable ROM Download Mode"
        depends on ESP32_REV_MIN_3
        default n
        help
            If set, during startup the app will burn an eFuse bit to permanently disable the UART ROM
            Download Mode. This prevents any future use of esptool.py, espefuse.py and similar tools.

            Once disabled, if the SoC is booted with strapping pins set for ROM Download Mode
            then an error is printed instead.

            It is recommended to enable this option in any production application where Flash
            Encryption and/or Secure Boot is enabled and access to Download Mode is not required.

            It is also possible to permanently disable Download Mode by calling
            esp_efuse_disable_rom_download_mode() at runtime.

endmenu  # Security features